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Summary 
This	  paper	  explores	  whether	  previous	  good	  deeds	  may	  license	  anti-­‐social	  behavior,	  such	  as	  appropriating	  a	   social	   surplus	   for	   private	   benefits,	   in	   a	   developing	   country	   context,	   namely	  Madagascar.	  We	   design	   a	  two-­‐step	  framed	  experiment,	  with	  one	  control	  treatment	  (a	  neutral	  task)	  and	  three	  test	  treatments	  (tasks	  enabling	  subjects	  to	  earn	  moral	  credits	  in	  3	  different	  ways),	  followed	  by	  a	  taking	  game	  in	  which	  subjects	  are	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  take	  an	  amount	  from	  a	  fund	  allocated	  to	  their	  University.	  On	  average,	  we	  find	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  three	  licensing	  conditions	  appropriate	  more	  than	  those	  in	  the	  control	  group,	  and	  that	  further	  differences	  emerge	  according	  to	  the	  way	  the	  moral	  credits	  have	  been	  earned. 
Key	  words:	  Moral	  self-­‐licensing,	  unethical	  behavior,	  behavioral	  experiment,	  taking	  game. 
JEL	  codes:	  C91,	  D03.	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1.	  INTRODUCTION 
A	   growing	   literature	   on	   moral	   self-­‐licensing	   is	   providing	   new	   perspective	   on	   the	   motivational	   forces	  underlying	  moral	  behavior.	  Traditionally,	  social	  preferences	  and	  moral	  behavior	  have	  been	  considered	  to	  be	  exogenous	  and	  consistent	  over	  time	  (Narloch	  et	  al,	  2012;	  Carpenter	  and	  Seki,	  2010;	  Castillo	  and	  Saysel,	  2005;	   Henrich,	   2000).	   However,	   recent	   research	   suggests	   that	   performing	   a	   virtuous	   deed	   can	   impact	  future	  decisions,	   specifically	  by	  decreasing	   the	  willingness	   to	   act	  pro-­‐socially	   in	   a	   subsequent	   situation,	  and	  vice	  versa	  (Khan	  and	  Dhar,	  2006;	  Sachdeva	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Mazar	  and	  Zhong,	  2010;	  Blanken	  et	  al.,	  2015;	  Mullen	   and	  Monin,	   2016,	   Clot	   et	   al.,	   2016).	   Anecdotal	   and	   empirical	   evidence	   shows,	   for	   example,	   that	  Prius	   Hybrid	   drivers	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   break	   crosswalk	   laws	   and	   receive	   fines,	   that	   consumers	   who	  purchase	   green	   products	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   steal,	   and	   that	   people	   who	   wrote	   positive	   stories	   about	  themselves	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  act	  selfishly,	  etc.	  (Woodyard,	  2009;	  Mazar	  and	  Zhong,	  2010,	  Sachdeva	  et	  al.,	  2009).	   In	  a	   similar	  vein,	  we	  conduct	  an	  experiment	   in	  a	  developing	  country	   that	   is	  designed	   to	   test	   the	  predictive	  ability	  of	  the	  ‘moral	  credit	  model’	  (i.e.	  good	  deeds	  establish	  moral	  credits	  that	  can	  be	  likened	  to	  deposits	   in	   a	   bank	   account	   that	   can	   be	   ‘withdrawn’	   to	   ‘purchase’	   the	   right	   to	   perform	   bad	   deeds).	  We	  study	  behavior	  by	  observing	  choices	  in	  a	  social	  dilemma	  in	  which	  private	  and	  public	  interests	  diverge.	  
Although	  studies	  on	  pro-­‐social	  preferences	  have	  proliferated	  in	  recent	  decades,	  much	  less	  is	  known	  about	  the	  motives	  underpinning	  antisocial	  behavior	  (Cox	  et	  al	  2013).	  As	  a	  result,	  our	  work	  makes	  three	  principal	  contributions	   to	   the	   literature	   to	   date.	   First,	   mobilizing	   recent	  work	   in	   psychology,	   we	   propose	   a	   new	  approach	  for	  studying	  anti-­‐social	  behavior	  (Khan	  and	  Dhar,	  2006;	  Sachdeva	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Mazar	  and	  Zhong,	  2010;	  Chiou	  and	  al.,	  2011).	  A	  second	  originality	  of	  our	  paper	  is	  that	  we	  are	  the	  first	  to	  test	  the	  moral	  credit	  model	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  developing	  country.	  Indeed,	  all	  of	  the	  previous	  research	  on	  moral	  self-­‐licensing	  has	   been	   conducted	   in	  Western	   countries	   (see	  Blanken	   et	   al.	   ,2015	   for	   a	  meta-­‐study),	  where	  we	  might	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suspect	   a	  WEIRD1	  effect	   (Heinrich	  et	   al.,	   2010).	   Indeed,	  Heinrich	  et	   al.	   (2010)	   argue	   that	  using	   samples	  drawn	  entirely	  from	  WEIRD	  societies	  to	  study	  human	  nature	  can	  be	  misleading.2	  Cardenas	  and	  Carpenter	  (2008)	  state	  that	  “many	  developing	  countries	  rely	  on	  local	  norms	  and	  rules	  of	  conduct	  to	  provide	  public	  goods	   and	   regulate	   extraction	   from	   common	   pool	   resources”	   and	   argue	   that	   these	   informal	   norms	   of	  fairness	  and	  justice	  depend	  on	  existing	  formal	  institutions	  (and	  laws	  in	  particular).	  Moreover,	  equity	  and	  fairness	  concerns	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  differ	  according	  to	  wealth	  (Armantier,	  2006).	  For	  these	  reasons,	  it	  seems	   important	   to	   us	   to	   investigate	   other-­‐regarding	   preferences	   in	   developing	   countries.	   A	   third	  originality	  of	  our	  paper	  consists	   in	  testing	  the	  impact	  of	  three	  different	  methods	  by	  which	  moral	  credits	  can	   be	   earned	   and	   the	  way	   in	  which	   this	  method	   influences	   subsequent	  moral	   self-­‐licensing.	   Although	  moderators	  such	  as	  the	  method	  by	  which	  moral	  credits	  are	  earned	  may	  affect	  both	  the	  occurrence	  and	  the	  extent	  of	   the	  moral	   licensing	  effect,	   research	  on	  moral	  self-­‐licensing	  moderators	   is	  still	  very	  scarce.	  The	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper	  proceeds	  as	  follows.	  An	  overview	  of	  the	  relevant	  literature	  is	  presented	  in	  section	  2.	  We	  then	  present	  the	  experimental	  design	  and	  the	  procedures	  used	  to	  test	  our	  predictions	  in	  section	  3.	  Section	  4	  provides	  the	  results	  and	  discussion.	  Section	  5	  concludes.	  
	  
2.	  LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  
Increasingly,	   individual	   preferences	   are	   described	   as	   being	   comprised	   of	   a	   combination	   of	   self-­‐interest	  and	   social	   preferences,	   implying	   that	   individuals	   strike	   a	   balance	   between	   self	   and	   group	   interests.	  Additionally,	  the	  social	  preferences	  considered	  by	  this	  literature	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  a	  given	  (Narloch	  et	  al,	  2012,	  Carpenter	  and	  Seki,	  2010;	  Castillo	  and	  Saysel,	  2005;	  Henrich,	  2000),	  correlated	  with	  socio-­‐economic	  and	   cultural	   characteristics,	   and	   vulnerable	   to	   being	   crowded	   out	   by	   exogenous	   mediators	   such	   as	  external	  regulations	  (Cardenas	  et	  al,	  2000)	  and	  rewards	  (Vollan,	  2008;	  Narloch	  et	  al,	  2012).	   In	  contrast,	  the	   idea	   of	   moral	   self-­‐licensing	   that	   has	   recently	   emerged	   argues	   that	   social	   preferences	   may	   be	  influenced	  by	  past	  behavior	  (Khan	  and	  Dhar,	  2006;	  Mazar	  and	  Zhong,	  2010;	  Clot	  et	  al	  2016;	  see	  Blanken	  et	  al.	  2015	  for	  a	  meta	  study	  and	  Mullen	  and	  Monin	  2016	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  review).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  WEIRD	  effect	  :	  Western,	  Educated,	  Industrialized,	  Rich,	  Democratic	  2	  As	   a	   colleague	   has	   pointed	   out,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   students	   in	   Madagascar	   are	   a	   relatively	  homogeneous	  population	  in	  comparison	  to	  populations	  in	  experimental	  labs	  in	  Europe	  or	  North	  America,	  which	  can	  be	  more	  ethnically	  diverse	  and	  exhibit	  more	  heterogeneous	  behaviour.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   students	   in	  Madagascar	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  privileged	  population,	  as	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  richer	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  population	  and	  have	  more	  opportunities.	  These	  two	  factors	  could	  have	  opposite	  effects	  on	  results	  concerning	  the	  licensing	  effect.	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‘Moral	  self-­‐licensing’	  refers	  to	  a	  situation	   in	  which	  being	   ‘good’	   leads	  to	  more	  self-­‐indulgent	  choices	   in	  a	  subsequent	  period	  (where	  the	  reverse	  situation	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘moral	  cleansing’).	  Khan	  and	  Dhar	  (2006)	  proposed	  a	  definition	  of	  moral	  self-­‐licensing	  as	  a	  non-­‐conscious	  effect	  that	  operates	  by	  providing	  a	  moral	  boost	   in	   self-­‐concept,	   which	   subsequently	   increases	   the	   preference	   for	   a	   relatively	   immoral	   action	   by	  dampening	  the	  negative	  self	  attributions	  associated	  with	  such	  behavior. In	  other	  words,	  this	  mechanism	  corresponds	  to	  a	  process	  of	  moral	  accounting	  whereby	  good	  deeds	  are	  assimilated	  as	  moral	  credits	  and	  bad	  deeds	  as	  moral	  debits.	  	  
We	  proceed	  by	  reviewing	  several	  studies	  that	  have	  explored	  the	  moral	  self-­‐licensing	  effect.	  Sachdeva et al 
(2009) showed	   how	   moral	   self-­‐licensing	   could	   negatively	   impact	   pro-­‐social	   preferences.	   In	   their	  experiment,	  participants	  who	  wrote	  a	  positive	  story	  about	  themselves	  were	  significantly	  less	  generous	  in	  a	  subsequent	  task,	  keeping	  more	  for	  themselves	  in	  a	  dictator	  game	  than	  participants	  who	  wrote	  a	  neutral	  story.	  In	  a	  study	  about	  green	  consumers,	  Mazar	  and	  Zhong	  (2010)	  reported	  that	  customers	  from	  a	  green	  store	  shared	  less	  money	  than	  customers	  from	  a	  conventional	  store.	  Green	  store	  customers	  were	  also	  more	  likely	   to	  adopt	  dubious	  behavior	  such	  as	  cheating	  and	  stealing.	  This	  study	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  provide	  evidence	  of	  a	  self-­‐regulation	  process	  and	  specifically,	  that	  licensing	  may	  lead	  to	  moral	  transgressions.	  In	  the	  environmental	  domain,	  Panzone	  et	  al	   (2012)	   found	  that	  making	  environmentally-­‐friendly	  choices	   in	  several	  areas	  of	  grocery	  shopping	  had	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  sustainable	  food	  consumption.	  	  Tiefenbeck	  et	  al	   (2013)	   have	   also	   shown	   that	   residents	   who	   received	   weekly	   feedback	   on	   their	   water	   consumption	  lowered	  their	  water	  use	  (6%	  on	  average),	  but	  they	  simultaneously	  increased	  their	  electricity	  consumption	  by	   5.6%	   compared	   with	   control	   subjects.	   In	   another	   vein, Clot	   et	   al	   (2013)	   examined	   how	   financial	  rewards	   for	   good	   deeds	   impacted	   the	   occurrence	   of	   self-­‐licensing	   behavior.	   The	   authors	   found	   that	  prefacing	   the	   dictator	   game	  with	   an	   unpaid	   good	   deed	   appears	   to	   license	   subsequent	   selfish	   behavior,	  whereas	   paying	   the	   dictator	   for	   the	   good	   deed	   dampens	   this	   effect.	   This	   experiment	   was	   based	   on	  hypothetical	  good	  deeds,	  which	  suggests	  that	  even	  imaginary	  good	  deeds	  can	  have	  the	  power	  to	  license	  a	  decrease	   in	   subsequent	   prosocial	   behavior.	   In	   an	   economic	   experiment	   in	   which	   subjects	   played	   a	  sequence	   of	   dictator	   game	   decisions,	   Branas-­‐Garza	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   found	   that	   participants’	   donations	   to	  recipients	  in	  each	  round	  were	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  the	  amount	  they	  donated	  in	  the	  previous	  period.	  The	   authors	   explain	   this	   pattern	   as	   the	   result	   of	   a	   self-­‐regulation	   mechanism:	   moral	   licensing	   (being	  selfish	  after	  being	  generous)	  and	  moral	  cleansing	  (being	  generous	  after	  being	  selfish).	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More	   recently,	   two	   studies	   have	   found	   that	   moral	   self-­‐licensing	   increases	   anti-­‐social	   behavior	   such	   as	  cheating	  (Clot	  et	  al,	  2014,	  Gneezy	  et	  al,	  2015).	  This	  experimental	  evidence	  supports	  our	  main	  behavioral	  hypothesis,	   which	   is	   that,	   under	   some	   circumstances,	   people	  who	  have	  obtained	  moral	   credits	   are	  more	  
likely	  to	  act	  anti-­socially	  later	  by,	  for	  instance,	  taking	  from	  a	  social	  surplus	  or	  a	  common	  account.	  	  
Interestingly,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  good	  deed	  (whether	  it	  actual	  or	  hypothetical)	  does	  not	  substantially	  impact	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  licensing	  effect.	  Indeed,	  our	  literature	  review	  shows	  that	  the	  licensing	  effect	  occurs	  both	  after	  a	  realized	  good	  deed	  (e.g.	  buying	  green	  products)	  as	  well	  as	  after	  a	   ‘hypothetical’	  establishment	  of	  moral	  worth	  (e.g.	  writing	  a	  positive	  story	  about	  oneself	  or	   imagining doing a good deed).	  In	  our	  view,	  the	  impact	  associated	  with	  a	  hypothetical	  good	  deed	  deserves	  special	  attention	  as	   it	  has	  direct	   implications	  for	  a	  real	  outcome	  (i.e.	  a	  hypothetical	  good	  deed	  can	  impact	  realized	  anti-­‐social	  behavior).	  We	  therefore	  elect	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  good	  will	  statement	  (e.g.	  a	  hypothetical	  good	  deed)	  on	  subsequent	  social	  preferences.	  	  
Hypothesis:	   Given	   a	   trade-­‐off	   between	   private	   and	   public	   benefits,	   stating	   one’s	   good	   intentions	   for	  ‘others’	  (at	  a	  cost	  to	  one’s	  self)	  will	  lead	  individuals	  to	  be	  more	  anti-­social	  in	  a	  subsequent	  decision,	  namely	  by	  prioritizing	  their	  private	  interests	  over	  public	  interests.	  	  
Although	   the	   idea	   of	   a	  moral	   regulation	   process	   is	   not	   entirely	   new	   (e.g.	   the	   transgression-­‐compliance	  effect	  from	  Carlsmith	  and	  Gross,	  1969),	  the	  recent	  expansion	  of	  related	  literature	  (mostly	  in	  psychology),	  coupled	  with	  an	  emerging	  consistency	  in	  economic	  modeling	  (Bénabou	  and	  Tirole,	  2010),	  significantly	  the	  relevance	  of	  moral	  self-­‐regulation	  as	  a	  topic	  for	  economic	  research.	  In	  line	  with	  these	  recent	  advances,	  we	  test	   to	   what	   extent	   moral	   self-­‐licensing	   may	   encourage	   anti-­‐social	   behavior	   such	   as	   reducing	   a	   social	  surplus	   in	  order	   to	   increase	  private	  benefits.	  To	  capture	  anti-­‐social	  behavior,	  we	   implemented	  a	   ‘taking	  game’3	  (Cox	   et	   al.,	   2013),	   which	   differs	   from	   the	   standard	   dictator	   game	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   initial	  distribution	  of	  the	  endowment.	  In	  the	  taking	  game,	  the	  initial	  endowment	  is	  allocated	  to	  the	  receiver	  and	  the	  dictator	  decides	  how	  much	  he	  would	  like	  to	  take	  from	  this	  endowment.	  In	  our	  work,	  we	  implement	  a	  slightly	  different	  version	  of	  this	  game.	  In	  Bardsley	  (2008),	  each	  player	  is	  paired	  with	  a	  receiver	  who	  is	  an	  anonymous	   student.	   We	   implement	   a	   version	   of	   the	   taking	   game	   in	   which	   there	   is	   a	   single	   common	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Similar	  games	  could	  also	  be	  found	  in	  the	  literature	  under	  different	  labels	  such	  as	  the	  ‘gangster	  game’	  (Eichenberger	  and	  Oberholzer-­‐Gee,	  1998)	  or	  ‘taking	  game’	  (Bardsley,,	  2008).	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receiver	  for	  all	  dictators,	  in	  this	  case	  a	  public	  institution.	  In	  sum,	  participants	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  take	  a	  part	  of	  an	  amount	  initially	  endowed	  to	  their	  home	  institution.	  A	  more	  detailed	  description	  of	  our	  design	  follows	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
3.	  EXPERIMENTAL	  DESIGN	  In	  our	  experiment,	  we	  address	  the	  question	  of	  how	  previous	  good	  deeds	  may	  license	  anti-­‐social	  behavior.	  In	  order	  to	  exclude	  the	  potential	  for	  risk	  preferences	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  decision,	  neither	  punishment	  nor	  repressive	   measures	   are	   part	   of	   the	   experimental	   design.	   Moreover,	   the	   game	   involves	   no	   strategic	  considerations	  in	  terms	  of	  monetary	  outcomes	  (participants’	  payoffs	  are	  independent	  from	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	  other	  participants).	  The	  game	   is	   therefore	  designed	   to	   isolate	   the	   temptation	   to	   appropriate	   a	  shared	  fund	  in	  order	  to	  enjoy	  private	  benefits.	  We	  design	  a	  two-­‐step	  framed	  experiment	  with	  one	  control	  treatment	  and	  three	  test	   treatments,	  which	  we	  carry	  out	  among	  students	   in	  Madagascar.	  While	   the	   first	  step	  for	  the	  treatment	  groups	  consists	  of	  a	   task	  that	  enables	  participants	  to	  earn	  moral	  credits,	   the	   first	  step	  for	  the	  control	  group	  is	  a	  neutral	  task	  (unscrambling	  sentences).	  In	  the	  second	  step,	  participants	  are	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  take	  money	  from	  a	  fund	  allocated	  to	  their	  University.	  
(a)	  Qualitative	  background	  
Pretests	  were	  conducted	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  design	  of	  the	  first	  step	  of	  the	  experiment.	  We	  conducted	  informal	   interviews	   in	   order	   to	   identify	   actions	   that	   are	   universally	   considered	   to	   be	   ‘good	   deeds’	   in	  Madagascar,	  and	  we	  used	  a	  self-­‐assessment	  scale	  to	  confirm	  that	  these	  “good	  deeds”	  do	  in	  fact	  generate	  moral	  credits.	  
Two	   good	   deeds	   were	   selected	   based	   on	   informal	   discussions	   with	   students.	   The	   first	   pertains	   to	   the	  	  environment	   surrounding	   the	   University.	   The	   campus	   is	   located	   in	   the	   Antananarivo	   hills,	   which	   is	  considered	   to	   be	   a	   very	   pleasant	   green	   setting.	   The	   surrounding	   area	   is	   generally	   well	   maintained,	  although	   litter	   is	   ubiquitous	   and	   rather	   noticeable.	   Students	   concerned	   with	   the	   appearance	   of	   their	  campus	  proposed	  cleaning	  the	  grounds	  as	  a	  good	  deed.	  	  The	  second	  good	  deed	  that	  was	  identified	  through	  discussions	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  guidebook	  aimed	  at	  new	  students.	  Because	  many	  students	  are	  from	  rural	  areas	   and	   are	   unfamiliar	  with	   the	   campus	   and	   its	   surroundings,	   there	  was	   consensus	   that	   they	  would	  benefit	  from	  a	  book	  detailing	  useful	  information	  about	  the	  campus.	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To	  validate	   the	  selection	  of	   these	   two	  good	  deeds,	  we	  ran	  a	  pretest	  on	  a	  group	  of	  53	  students	   from	  the	  University	   of	   Antananarivo.	   Following	   the	   self-­‐assessment	  method	   used	   by	   Khan	   and	   Dhar	   (2006),	   we	  asked	  subjects	  to	  indicate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  agree	  or	  disagree,	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  7	  (1=”Strongly	  disagree”,	   7=”Strongly	   agree”),	   with	   the	   following	   four	   statements:	   “I	   am	   compassionate”,	   “I	   am	  sympathetic”,	   “I	  am	  generous”	  and	  “I	  am	  helpful”.	  Khan	  and	  Dhar	  (2006)	  used	  these	   items	  because	  they	  exhibited	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   internal	   reliability	   (Cronbach’s	   α	   =	   0.84).	   	   Students	   were	   then	   randomly	  assigned	  to	  a	   licensing	  or	  a	  control	  condition.	   In	  the	   licensing	  condition,	  subjects	  were	  asked	  to	   imagine	  that	  they	  engaged	  in	  a	  volunteering	  activity,	  selecting	  one	  of	  the	  two	  good	  deed	  options.	  Students	  in	  the	  control	   group	   were	   asked	   to	   unscramble	   sentences.	   Results	   of	   the	   self-­‐assessment	   scale	   show	   that	  participants	   evaluated	   themselves	   significantly	  more	  positively	  on	   the	   four	   self-­‐assessment	   attributes	   if	  they	   had	   imagined	  performing	   a	   good	  deed	   (licensing	   group)	   than	   if	   they	   had	  not	   (control	   group)	   (see	  table	  1),	  regardless	  of	  which	  good	  deed	  they	  chose.	  We	  therefore	  selected	  these	  tasks	  in	  order	  to	  induce	  the	  earning	  of	  moral	  credits	  in	  the	  first	  step	  of	  our	  experimental	  design.	  
Table	  1.	  Mean	  self-­‐assessment	  in	  licensing	  and	  control	  conditions.	  I	  am…	   Licensing	  (N=37)	   Control	  (N=16)	   Ranksum	  test4	  Compassionate	   5.216216	  	  	  	  (0.2743683)	   4.1875	  	  	  	  (0.3442232)	   z	  =	  -­‐2.251,	  p	  =	  0.0244	  Sympathetic	   5.459459	  	  	  	  (0.264503)	   4.375	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.4643544)	   z	  =	  -­‐1.956,	  p	  =	  0.0505	  Generous	   5.447368	  	  	  	  (0.2376311)	   4.3125	  	  	  	  (0.3619248)	   z	  =	  -­‐2.382,	  p	  =	  0.0172	  Helpful	   5.351351	  	  	  	  (0.2853169	   4.375	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.4552929)	   z	  =	  -­‐1.860,	  p	  =	  0.0628	  Note:	  The	  standard	  error	  of	  the	  mean	  is	  in	  brackets.	  	  
The	  second	  step	  consists	  of	  an	  adapted	  version	  of	  the	  taking	  game.	  Instead	  of	  the	  original	  pairwise	  player	  set-­‐up	  (Bardsley,	  2008),	  all	  players	  are	  paired	  with	  the	  University	  as	  the	  receiving	  player.	  	  Participants	  are	  informed	  that	  the	  University	  has	  been	  allocated	  funding	  by	  a	  research	  project,	  and	  that	  the	  money	  must	  be	  invested	  in	  the	  University's	  infrastructure.	  Subjects	  are	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  take	  any	  amount	  between	  0	  and	  30,000	  Ariary	  from	  this	   fund,	  and	  the	  instructions	  clearly	  state	  that	  whatever	  was	  taken	  from	  the	  fund	  would	  directly	  reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  funds	  available	  for	  the	  University’s	  use.	  Thus,	  students	  are	  not	  only	  presented	  with	  the	  option	  to	  take,	  but	  also	  with	  a	  message	  emphasizing	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  taking.	  The	  questionnaires	   include	  a	  choice	  table	  that	  presents	  all	  of	   the	  pay-­‐off	  options,	  explicitly	  detailing	  the	  breakdown	  between	  the	  amount	  taken	  and	  what	  remains	  for	  the	  University.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Non	  parametrical	  Ranksum	  tests	  were	  used	  due	  to	  the	  small	  sample	  size.	  
	  	   8	  
The	   framing	   of	   the	   experiment	   highlights	   the	   conflict	   between	   using	   money	   for	   private	   benefits	  (appropriating	   funds	   for	   yourself)	   vs.	   for	   public	   benefits	   (leaving	   funds	   for	   the	   University's	  infrastructure).	  If	  social	  preferences	  are	  exogenous	  and	  consistent	  over	  time,	  as	  is	  traditionally	  assumed,	  then	  volunteering	  for	  the	  University	  should	  not	  make	  students	  more	  likely	  to	  take	  from	  a	  fund	  dedicated	  to	   improving	   the	  University’s	   infrastructure.	   If	   volunteering	   does	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   the	  willingness	   to	  take	  from	  the	  fund,	  however,	  this	  would	  constitute	  evidence	  of	  a	  moral	  self-­‐regulation	  process	  by	  which	  earning	  moral	  credits	  subsequently	  licenses	  an	  individual	  to	  engage	  in	  anti-­‐social	  behavior.	  	  
(b)	  Experimental	  procedure	  
A	  total	  of	  367	  students	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Antananarivo	  participated	  in	  the	  experiment	  during	  one	  of	  their	  course	  lectures.5	  All	  participants	  were	  unfamiliar	  with	  experimental	  games.	  We	  conducted	  3	  sessions	  in	  which	  participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  into	  one	  of	   four	  groups	  (one	  control	  treatment	  and	  three	  test	  treatments).	  Within	  each	  session,	  subjects	  were	  only	  allowed	  to	  talk	  to	  administrators.	  There	  was	  1	  administrator	   for	   every	   20	   participants.	   Students	   were	   arranged	   as	   they	   would	   be	   during	   an	   exam	   in	  order	   to	   ensure	   that	   their	   decisions	   were	   made	   in	   private.	   In	   order	   to	   minimize	   discussion	   and	  contamination	  between	  sessions,	  the	  sessions	  were	  split	  among	  3	  different	  departments6	  in	  the	  university.	  Questionnaires	   were	   anonymous	   and	   identified	   by	   a	   unique	   number.	   The	   professors	   of	   these	   lectures	  were	   not	   involved	   in	   administering	   the	   experiments	   so	   as	   to	   minimize	   any	   potential	   experimenter	  demand	  effect.	  	  
Table	  2.	  Game	  design7	  
Groups	   Stage	  1	   Stage	  2	   Stage	  3	   Money	  at	  stake	  (MGA)	  
	  
Control	   Neutral	  task	  	  
Licensing	  condition	  Treatment	  1	   Good	  deed	  Treatment	  2	   Good	  deed	  with	  option	  to	  opt	  out	  Treatment	  3	   Good	  deed	  with	  option	  to	  select	  the	  level	  of	  participation	  
Filler	  task	  	   Taking	  game	   30,000	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  We	  ensured	  that	  none	  of	  the	  students	  who	  had	  participated	  to	  either	  of	  the	  two	  pretests	  took	  part	  in	  the	  experiment. 6	  Sessions	  were	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Economics,	  the	  Department	  of	  Management,	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Agriculture	  7	  From	  a	  more	  conceptual	  viewpoint,	  individuals	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  making	  a	  moral	  decision	  in	  stage	  1	  and	  a	  financial	  decision	  in	  stage	  3.	  We	  contend	  that	  these	  decisions	  are	  not	  independent,	  but	  rather	  that	  they	  influence	  each	  other.	  Indeed,	  there	  appear	  to	  be	  interactions	  between	  the	  mental	  accounting	  and	  moral	  accounting	  processes,	  which	  is	  evidenced	  by	  various	  types	  of	  compensations,	  order	  effects,	  and	  reference	  points,	  which	  can	  also	  support	  multiple	  selves	  theories.	  A	  natural	  and	  worthwhile	  extension	  of	  this	  work	  would	  consist	  of	  formalizing	  these	  effects	  in	  a	  parsimonious	  behavioural	  model,	  but	  this	  task	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  our	  paper.	  
	  	   9	  
	  
The	   experiment	   was	   comprised	   of	   three	   stages,	   which	   are	   illustrated	   in	   table	   2.	   In	   the	   first	   stage,	  treatments	  1,	  2	  and	  3	  were	  intended	  to	  induce	  an	  accumulation	  of	  moral	  credits	  (the	  ‘moral	  self-­‐licensing	  conditions’)	   providing	   students	   the	   opportunity	   to	   establish	   a	   pro-­‐social	   self-­‐concept.	   In	   the	   control	  condition,	  this	  opportunity	  is	  replaced	  with	  a	  dummy	  task,	  which	  consists	  of	  unscrambling	  four	  sentences.	  The	   questionnaire	   length	  was	   therefore	   similar	   among	   all	   groups	   so	   as	   not	   to	   arouse	   suspicion	   among	  participants.	   This	   method	   was	   also	   used	   by	   Khan	   and	   Dhar	   (2006),	   who	   provide	   evidence	   that	  unscrambling	  sentences	  does	  not	  affect	  individual’s	  self-­‐concept.	  
	  
In	  the	  licensing	  condition,	  we	  asked	  participants	  to	  imagine	  that	  they	  could	  volunteer	  for	  the	  University	  by	  either	  1)	  ‘cleaning	  buildings’	  surroundings’	  or	  2)	  ‘creating	  a	  guide	  book	  for	  new	  students’.	  All	  treatments	  proposed	   the	   same	   volunteering	   activities.	   However,	   we	   vary	   the	   way	   in	   which	   students	   in	   these	  treatments	  could	  respond	  and	  earn	  their	  moral	  credit.	  In	  treatment	  1,	  subjects	  could	  simply	  select	  one	  of	  the	   two	  good	  deeds.	   In	   treatment	  2,	   subjects	   could	  also	  opt	  out	  of	   volunteering.	  Khan	  and	  Dhar	   (2006)	  used	   these	   options	   (with	   and	   without	   an	   opt-­‐out	   clause)	   in	   two	   different	   experiments.	   They	   found	  evidence	  of	  a	  licensing	  effect	  in	  both	  experiments,	  but	  were	  unable	  to	  measure	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  effect.	  In	  treatment	  3,	  subjects	  could	  select	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  they	  wished	  to	  dedicate	  to	  the	  good	  deed	  (1	  hour,	  2	  hours,	  3	  hours,	  half	  a	  day	  or	  a	  full	  day).	  This	  third	  treatment	  aims	  to	  reveal	  potential	  magnitude	  effects	  in	  the	  moral	  credit	  model	  (i.e.	  the	  more	  you	  invest	  in	  a	  pro-­‐social	  activity,	  the	  greater	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  you	  feel	  licensed	  to	  act	  antisocially	  afterwards).	  	  
In	  the	  second	  stage,	  subjects	  were	  asked	  to	  describe	  the	  impact	  that	  this	  decision	  had	  on	  their	  self-­‐concept	  (a	  filler	  task8).	  After	  completing	  stages	  1	  and	  2,	  participants	  were	  invited	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  next	  sheet	  of	  the	  questionnaire.	  In	  stage	  3,	  they	  were	  told	  that	  a	  foreign	  institution	  (LAMETA)	  had	  granted	  money	  to	  their	  University	   for	   infrastructure	   improvement	   (no	   specific	   information	   was	   given	   on	   the	   total	   amount	  granted).	  Measures	  were	  taken	  to	  convince	  students	  that	  their	  decisions	  will	  have	  real	  consequences	  on	  the	   grant	   offered	   to	   the	   University	   and	   on	   the	   improvement	   of	   its	   infrastructure.9 	  Both	   the	   oral	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  A	  filler	  task	  was	  implemented	  to	  minimize	  the	  possibility	  that	  participants	  will	  perceive	  a	  link	  between	  the	  first	  and	  the	  third	  stages	  of	  the	  experiment	  (Khan	  and	  Dhar,	  2006).	  9	  We	  cannot	   entirely	   rule	  out	   the	   fact	   that	   some	  students	  may	  not	  have	   trusted	   this	   statement,	  but	  we	  assume	   that	   any	  potential	  impact	  that	  this	  may	  have	  had	  on	  decisions	  would	  be	  similar	  across	  treatments.	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instructions	  and	  individual	  questionnaires	  emphasized	  this	  point.	  Participants	  were	  told	  that	  they	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  take	  up	  to	  30,000	  Ariary	  out	  of	  this	  fund.	  A	  table	  of	  choices	  was	  provided	  that	  specified,	  for	  each	  option,	  the	  possible	  amounts	  that	  could	  taken	  from	  the	  fund	  and	  the	  amount	  that	  would	  remain	  for	  the	  University	  in	  each	  case.	  The	  instructions	  stated	  in	  capital	  and	  bold	  letters	  that	  the	  student’s	  choice	  was	  real	   (i.e.	  not	  hypothetical)	  and	  confidential.	   	   It	   is	  also	  clearly	  stated	   that	  any	  amount	   that	  was	   taken	   for	  oneself	   would	   directly	   reduce	   the	   amount	   available	   for	   improving	   the	   University's	   infrastructure.	   Two	  checkboxes	  were	  offered:	  “I	  choose	  to	  take	  in	  the	  common	  fund”,	  followed	  by	  a	  space	  in	  which	  participants	  could	  specify	  the	  amount	  (in	  increments	  of	  1000,	  up	  to	  30,000	  Ariary),	  versus	  “I	  choose	  not	  to	  take	  in	  the	  common	  fund”.	  The	  questionnaires	  were	  then	  collected	  and	  a	  lottery	  determined	  which	  participants	  were	  selected	  to	  be	  paid	  according	  to	  the	  choice	  they	  made	  in	  the	  game.	  One	  in	  ten	  participants	  was	  selected	  for	  payment.	  
This	  payment	  method,	  called	  a	  ‘Random	  Incentivized	  System’,	  has	  been	  studied	  by	  Armantier	  (2006),	  who	  compared	   results	   between	   a	   sure	   and	   a	   random	   gain	   and	   found	   no	   significant	   difference.	   In	   addition,	  Camerer	   and	   Hogarth	   (1999;	   see	   also	   Locey	   et	   al.,	   2011)	   demonstrated	   that	   this	  method	   can	   generate	  reliable	  and	  accurate	  results	  while	  permitting	  the	  collection	  of	  data	  from	  much	  larger	  samples.	  
The	  amount	  at	  stake	  (30,000	  Ariary)	  is	  the	  equivalent	  of	  15	  meals	  (2000	  Ariary	  is	  the	  average	  price	  for	  a	  meal	  proposed	  in	  one	  of	  the	  many	  restaurants	  located	  near	  the	  campus).	  
(c)	  Control	  variables	  
Demographic	   and	   additional	   general	   questions	   were	   asked	   at	   the	   end	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   any	   potential	  impact	  they	  could	  have	  had	  on	  the	  decisions	  made	  during	  the	  experiment.	  Information	  on	  income,	  gender,	  origin,	  and	  religion	  were	  also	  gathered.	  Additional	  questions	  assessing	  risk	  and	  positional	  attitudes	  were	  included	  in	  order	  to	  control	  for	  any	  potential	  interactions	  with	  moral	  self-­‐licensing.	  	  
Predictions	  regarding	  the	  effects	  of	  various	  socio-­‐demographic	  variables	  on	  behavior	  in	  taking	  games	  are	  scarce	   in	   the	  empirical	   literature	  and	  the	  studies	   that	  are	  available	  mainly	  discuss	  gender	  effects.	  Given	  the	  symmetry	  between	  the	  dictator	  game	  and	  the	  taking	  game,	  we	  will	  make	  reference	  to	  some	  dictator	  game	  findings,	  but	  we	  do	  so	  in	  light	  of	  this	  qualification.	  Some	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Bekkers,	  2007	  and	  references	  therein)	  have	   found	   that	  donations	   increase	  with	  higher	   income,	   leading	  us	   to	   expect	   a	  decrease	   in	   the	  amounts	   taken	   from	   individuals	   with	   higher	   incomes.	   The	   experimental	   literature	   also	   suggests	   that	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women	  behave	  less	  selfishly	  than	  men	  (Engel,	  2011;	  Eckel	  and	  Grossman,	  1996)	  and	  are	  less	  competitive	  (Gneezy,	  2003).	  A	   recent	  paper	  by	  Chowdhury	  et	   al.	   (2014)	   found	   that	  women	  are	  more	  altruistic	   than	  men	  and	  allocate	  significantly	  more	  to	  the	  recipient	  in	  the	  taking	  game	  compared	  to	  the	  giving	  game.	  The	  authors	   observe	   that	   a	   ‘‘taking	   frame	  makes	   males	   significantly	   more	   selfish,	   but	   females	   significantly	  more	  egalitarian	  compared	  to	  a	  giving	  frame’’.	  In	  line	  with	  this	  research,	  we	  predict	  that	  women	  will	  take	  less	   than	   men.	   Regarding	   the	   impact	   of	   origin,	   we	   distinguish	   between	   two	   different	   subgroups:	  participants	  from	  the	  capital	  city	  (Antananarivo)	  and	  those	  from	  rural	  areas.	  In	  Madagascar,	  being	  from	  a	  rural	  area	  is	  generally	  associated	  with	  lower	  incomes	  and	  more	  difficult	  living	  conditions.	  Given	  that	  the	  experiment	  was	   carried	  out	   in	  Antananarivo,	  we	  argue	   that	  people	   from	  rural	   areas	   (‘strangers’)	  might	  feel	   less	   concerned	   about	   the	   local	   public	   good	   and	   exhibit	   a	   greater	   willingness	   to	   take	   from	   the	  University’s	   fund	   (Habyarimana	   et	   al.,	   2007).	  Regarding	   religious	   identity,	   the	   available	   evidence	   is	   not	  clear-­‐cut:	  while	  some	  papers	  find	  a	  positive	  impact	  of	  religious	  identity	  on	  giving	  (Shariff	  and	  Norenzayan,	  2007;	  Ahmed	  and	  Salas,	  2011),	  others	  do	  not	  (Benjamin	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  However,	  these	  differences	  could	  be	  due	   to	   a	   variety	   of	   factors	   and	   could	   arise,	   for	   example,	   from	   differences	   between	   those	  who	   respond	  according	  to	  a	   loose	  sense	  of	  religious	   identity	  vs.	   those	  who	  regularly	  attend	  religious	  services	  or	   from	  differences	  between	  religious	  converts	  and	  those	  who	  were	  raised	  in	  a	  given	  religion	  (see	  Brañas-­‐Garza	  et	  al.,	   2014).	   Adherence	   to	   a	   religion	   that	   emphasizes	   the	   equality	   of	   human	   beings	   presumably	   induces	  people	   to	   behave	  more	   fairly	   and	   cooperatively.	   Christianity,	   for	   example,	   places	   a	   strong	   emphasis	   on	  sharing,	   and	   certain	   Protestant	   movements	   are	   indeed	   critical	   of	   gathering	   wealth	   (Hayo	   and	   Vollan,	  2012).	  
We	  also	  created	  two	  control	  variables	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  treatment	  effects	  that	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  our	  treatments;	  one	  variable	  is	  related	  to	  risk	  preferences	  and	  one	  is	  related	  to	  positional	  preferences.	   To	   measure	   risk	   preferences,	   we	   relied	   on	   a	   simple	   elicitation	   method	   that	   is	   easy	   for	  participants	  to	  understand	  and	  is	  commonly	  used	  as	  an	  indicator	  for	  an	  individual’s	  propensity	  to	  engage	  in	  various	  risk-­‐related	  behaviors	  (Charness	  et	  al.	  2013).	  	  Brock	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  found	  that	  ‘the	  more	  money	  decision-­‐makers	   transfer	   in	   the	   standard	   dictator	   game,	   the	   more	   likely	   they	   are	   to	   equalize	   payoff	  chances	  under	  risk’.	  For	  this	  reason,	  we	  built	  an	  index	  for	  risk	  preferences	  based	  on	  two	  questions	  from	  the	   survey.	   In	   the	   first	   question,	   participants	   were	   asked	   to	   indicate	   which	   option	   they	   would	   prefer	  between	  a	  sure	  gain	  of	  3000	  MGA	  (=	  0	  points)	  and	  80%	  chance	  of	  earning	  4500	  MGA	  (=	  1	  point).	  In	  the	  second	  question,	  participants	  had	  to	  choose	  between	  a	  sure	  gain	  of	  24	  000	  MGA	  (=	  0	  points)	  and	  a	  25%	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chance	  of	  earning	  100	  000	  MGA	  (=	  2	  points).	  The	  index	  for	  risk	  preferences	  is	  calculated	  by	  summing	  the	  points	  earned	  in	  these	  questions.	  The	  index	  varied	  from	  highly	  risk	  averse	  (0	  points)	  to	  highly	  risk	  taking	  (3	  points).	  We	  measure	  positional	  preferences	  using	  a	  binary	  choice	  that	  is	  equal	  to	  one	  when	  participants	  indicated	  they	  would	  prefer	  to	  earn	  a	  monthly	  salary	  that	  is	  lower	  in	  absolute	  terms,	  but	  higher	  than	  the	  salary	  of	  others	  (500	  000	  MGA	  /	  400	  000	  MGA)	  rather	  than	  a	  higher	  absolute	  salary	  that	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  salary	   of	   others	   (600	   000	   MGA	   /	   600	   000	   MGA).	   Lastly,	   Bekkers	   (2007)	   also	   found	   that	   generosity	  increases	  with	  prosocial	  orientation,	  which	  suggests	  that	  positional	   individuals	  (i.e.,	   those	  who	  prefer	  to	  be	  worse	  off	  in	  absolute	  terms	  as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  better	  off	  than	  others)	  (Solnick	  and	  Hemenway,	  1998)	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  take	  more,	  ceteris	  paribus.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  of	  the	  predictions	  regarding	  these	  preferences	  are	  far	  from	  being	  clear-­‐cut,	  we	  expect	  that	  they	  may	  nonetheless	  prove	  useful	  in	  interpreting	  our	  results.	  	  
4.	  RESULTS	  
The	   characteristics	   of	   our	   sample	   (367	   subjects)	   are	   presented	   in	   table	   3.	   The	   sample	   is	  well	   balanced	  across	  conditions,	  and	  is	  comprised	  of	  51%	  male	  subjects	  who	  report	  an	  average	  age	  of	  21.64	  years.	  	  
Table	  3.	  Characteristics	  of	  participants	  (Percentage	  or	  mean)	  	  	   Control	  (n=175)	   License	  (n=192)	   Overall	  (n=367)	  
Age	   21,63	   21,64	   21,64	  
Male	   50%	   52%	   51%	  
Rural	   27%	   23%	   25%	  
Income	   	   	   	  <50	  000	  Ar/month	   45%	   36%	   41%	  <100	  000	  Ar/month	  ;	  >50	  000Ar/month	   31%	   36%	   33%	  <100	  000	  Ar/month	   24%	   28%	   26%	  
Religion	   	   	   	  Catholic	   40%	   43%	   42%	  Protestant	   55%	   53%	   54%	  Others	  10	   5%	   4%	   4%	  
Risk	  Preferences	   0.642	   0.646	   0.644	  
Church	  attendance	  	   4.2	   3.6	   3.9	  
Positional	  attitude	   0.31	   0.33	   0.32	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Others	  includes:	  Muslims,	  Hindus	  and	  Jews.	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Thirty-­‐three	  subjects	  did	  not	  indicate	  a	  response	  in	  the	  taking	  game	  (the	  amount	  that	  they	  choose	  to	  take	  from	  the	  University	  fund).	  Only	  3	  subjects	  selected	  the	  opt-­‐out	  clause	  in	  treatment	  2.	  Our	  results	  are	  based	  on	  the	  remaining	  331	  observations.	  The	  main	  findings	  are	  presented	  below.	  
	  
Finding	  1:	  Anti-­social	  behavior	  increases	  under	  moral	  self-­licensing	  treatments.	  
Our	  first	  main	  result	  is	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  moral	  self-­‐licensing	  condition	  (treatment	  1)	  appear	  to	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  take	  from	  the	  common	  fund	  than	  participants	  in	  the	  control	  treatment.	  First,	  the	  number	  of	  participants	  who	  take	  money	  from	  the	  University’s	  fund	  is	  greater	  in	  the	  moral	  self-­‐licensing	  condition	  (81.66%	  versus	  71.74%	  in	  the	  control	  group).	  Furthermore,	  subjects	  who	  declare	  they	  would	  engage	  in	  a	  good	   deed	   for	   the	   University	   take	   9.92	   percent	   more	   from	   the	   University’s	   fund.	   Second,	   among	  participants	  who	  decide	  to	  take	  from	  the	  common	  fund,	  subjects	  in	  the	  licensing	  group	  take	  significantly	  more	  than	  those	  in	  the	  control	  group11	  (8.92	  percent	  more,	  z=-­‐2.957,	  p	  =0.0031).	  Of	  the	  30,000.00	  Ariary	  eligible	   for	   the	   taking	   from	   the	   common	   fund,	   the	   average	   amount	   taken	   by	   participants	   is	   9,528.926	  Ariary	   in	   the	   control	   group	   (SEM 12 =	   906.2132)	   versus	   13,838.1	   Ariary	   in	   the	   licensing	   group	  (SEM=704.3868),	  and	  this	  difference	  is	  statistically	  significant	  (	  z	  =	  -­‐3.771,	  p=0.0002).	  Figures	  1,	  2	  and	  3	  illustrate	  these	  findings.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Unless	  otherwise	  specified,	  we	  use	  the	  Wilcoxon	  signed-­‐rank	  test	  for	  statistical	  significance.	  12	  Standard	  Error	  of	  the	  Mean.	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Thus,	  not	  only	  is	  there	  a	  greater	  proportion	  of	  students	  who	  take	  in	  the	  moral	  licensing	  treatment	  relative	  to	  the	  control	  treatment,	  but	  the	  average	  amount	  taken	  by	  those	  in	  the	  moral	  self-­‐licensing	  treatments	  is	  also	  greater	  than	  the	  average	  amount	  taken	  by	  those	  in	  the	  control	  treatment.	  	  
A	  Quade	  test	  on	  the	  entire	  sample	  reveals	  that	  the	  average	  amounts	  taken	  in	  the	  four	  groups	  (the	  control	  treatment	  and	  three	  test	  treatments)	  are	  significantly	  different	  from	  each	  other	  at	  the	  1%	  level	  (F=7.007;	  p=0.000).	  Taken	  one	  by	  one,	  the	  three	  licensing	  treatments	  are	  also	  significantly	  different	  from	  the	  control	  treatment.13	  These	   tests	   for	   significance	   are	   summarized	   in	   table	   4.	   Figure	   4	   summarizes	   the	   average	  amount	  taken	  in	  each	  treatment.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  We	  use	  a	  Wilcoxon	  sign-­‐rank	  test	  to	  test	  for	  differences	  between	  treatments	  and	  control.	  Although	  multiple	  paired	  difference	  tests	  may	  suffer	  from	  a	  compounded	  alpha	  error,	  the	  Quade	  statistic,	  as	  a	  single	  test,	  lends	  further	  support	  to	  the	  results.	  We	  thank	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  raising	  this	  issue.	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Figure	  4.	  Average	  amount	  taken	  across	  Treatments	  1,	  2	  &	  3	  and	  choices.	  
Table	  4.	  Difference	  between	  treatments	  1,	  2	  &	  3	  and	  the	  control	  treatment	  (Wilcoxon	  signed-­rank	  test)	  	  
Control	  n=159	   T1	  (Good	  deed),	  n=63	   Control/T1	   T2	  (Good	  deed	  +	  Opt	  out	  clause),	  n=66	   Control/T2	   T3	  (Good	  deed+	  Length),	  n=43	   Control/T3	  9528.926	   13277.23	   z=-­‐2.444;	  	  p=0.0145	   14378.79	   z=-­‐3.438;	  p=0.0006	   14325.58	   z=-­‐2.959;	  p=0.0031	  	  
In	   the	   following	  paragraph,	  we	  discuss	   the	  different	  ways	   in	  which	   the	   good	  deed	   is	   implemented,	   and	  how	  these	  different	  treatments	  impact	  subsequent	  anti-­‐social	  behavior.	  	  
	  
Finding	   2:	   Treatments	  2	  and	  3	  have	  a	  slightly	  greater	  effect	  on	   licensing	  behavior.	  Low	  investment	   in	  the	  
good	  deed	  leads	  to	  greater	  anti-­social	  behavior.	  A	  counter-­intuitive	  magnitude	  effect	  is	  observed	  in	  treatment	  
3.	  	  
Turning	   now	   to	   the	   treatments	   that	   are	   designed	   to	   induce	   the	   earning	   of	   moral	   credits,	   we	   find	   that	  treatment	   2	   (good	   deed	  with	   an	   opt	   out	   option)	   and	   treatment	   3	   (good	   deed	  with	   a	   varying	   degree	   of	  investment)	   led	   to	   slightly	  greater	   licensing	   than	   treatment	  1	   (good	  deed	  with	  no	  options).	   Specifically,	  subjects	   in	   treatments	   2	   and	   3	   took	   approximately	   1,000.00	   Ariary	   more	   than	   those	   in	   treatment	   1	  (although	  this	  difference	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant).	  We	  also	  note	  that	  there	  are	  half	  as	  many	  ‘no	  takers’	  (subjects	   choosing	   not	   to	   take	   from	   the	   fund)	   in	   treatments	   2	   and	   3	   relative	   to	   treatment	   1	   (13.6%	   in	  treatment	  2	  and	  13.9%	   in	   treatment	  3	  versus	  26.7%	   in	   treatment	  1).	  This	   could	   serve	  as	  evidence	   that	  treatments	  2	  and	  3	  are	  more	  effective	  in	  terms	  of	  earning	  perceived	  moral	  credits,	  however,	  no	  conclusive	  statements	  can	  be	  made	  in	  this	  regard.	  Moreover,	  we	  do	  not	  observe	  any	  statistical	  difference	  in	  terms	  of	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the	   average	   amount	   taken	   between	   the	   two	   activities	   (cleaning	   the	   University	   grounds	   and	   creating	   a	  guidebook).	  
Upon	   closer	   examination	   of	   	   treatment	   3,	   we	   find	   that	   the	   degree	   of	   investment	   in	   the	   good	   deed	  significantly	   the	   degree	   of	   moral	   self-­‐licensing.	   Specifically,	   subjects	   who	   indicate	   that	   they	   would	  volunteer	  for	  more	  than	  half	  a	  day	  take	  11,821	  Ariary,	  which	  is	  significantly	  less14	  (z=	  2.5482,	  p=0.0147)	  than	  those	  choosing	  to	  volunteer	  for	  less	  than	  half	  a	  day,	  who	  appropriate	  19,000	  Ariary.	  We	  suspect	  that	  two	  effects	  may	  be	  at	  play	  here	   :	  moral	   licensing	  and	  moral	  consistency	  (on	   this	   issue,	   see	  Conway	  and	  Peetz,	  2012;	  Mullen	  and	  Monin,	  2016).	  First,	  a	  high	  level	  of	  commitment	  (volunteering	  for	  more	  than	  half	  a	  day)	  could	  promote	  a	  strong	  pro-­‐social	  self-­‐concept	  that	  is	  incompatible	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  anti-­‐social	  behavior	   (moral	   consistency).	   This	   could	  be	   supported	  by	   the	   ‘cognitive	  dissonance’	   effect	   that	   is	   often	  used	  to	  explain	  behavioral	  consistency.	  Second,	  a	   lower	   level	  of	  commitment	  (volunteering	  for	   less	  than	  half	   a	   day)	   may	   provide	   a	   moral	   boost	   in	   self-­‐concept	   (moral	   licensing).	   Figure	   6	   depicts	   the	   average	  amount	  taken	  depending	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  invested	  in	  the	  "licensing	  activity’’	  in	  treatment	  3.	  	  
	  
	  Figure	  5.	  Average	  amount	  taken,	  by	  time	  of	  investment	  for	  the	  good	  deed.	  
	  Next,	  we	   employ	   a	   hurdle	  model	   in	   order	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   specific	   determinants	   of	   anti-­‐social	  behavior	   (table	   5).	   The	   first	   and	   second	   columns	   report	   results	   from	   the	   Probit	  model	   (for	   the	   binary	  option	   ‘take	  versus	  no	  take’)	  and	  the	  Tobit	  model	  (based	  on	  the	  sample	  restricted	  to	  positive	  amounts),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  A	   ‘Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney’ non-parametric test is preferred when at least one of the two samples involved in the 
comparison is below 60.	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respectively,	  which	  are	  used	   to	   identify	   the	  starting	  values	   for	   the	   first	  and	  second	  stages	  of	   the	  hurdle	  model.	  	  
	  
Finding	  3:	  Income,	  origin,	  religion,	  risk	  and	  positional	  preferences	  do	  not	  to	  affect	  anti-­social	  behavior.	  	  
Regression	  results	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  hurdle	  model	  support	  our	  previous	  findings	  (table	  5).	  In	  this	  model,	   subjects	   in	   the	   licensing	   condition	   take	   an	   average	   of	   3,240.27	  more	   than	   those	   in	   the	   control	  treatment.	   The	   regression	   also	   highlights	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   gender	   effect	   indicating,	   as	   expected,	   that	  women	   take	   less	   than	   men.	   The	   regression	   does	   not	   support	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   relationship	   between	  taking	  behavior	  and	  income,	  origin,	  religion,	  or	  risk	  preferences.	  Since	  the	  licensing	  effect	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  non-­‐conscious	  phenomenon	  (Khan	  and	  Dhar,	  2006),	   these	  results	  are	  not	  surprising	  and	  lead	  us	  to	  suspect	  that	  the	  licensing	  effect	  could	  apply	  universally	  to	  most	  individuals	  and	  therefore	  may	  not	  differ	  significantly	  according	  to	  individuals’	  socio-­‐economic	  characteristics.	  	  
The	   hurdle	   analysis	   in	   table	   5	   also	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   licensing	   condition	   plays	   a	   role	   in	   subjects	  decisions	  regarding	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  take	  from	  the	  University	  fund.	  The	  parameter	  estimate	  associated	  with	  being	   in	   the	   licensing	   condition	   (treatment	  1)	   is	   0.52,	  which	   indicates	   that	   being	   in	   this	   condition	  increases	  the	  predicted	  probability	  of	  taking	  from	  the	  fund.	  Gender	  has	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  propensity	  to	  take	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  model,	  indicating	  that	  gender	  affects	  the	  amount	  taken	  by	  subjects	  rather	  than	  the	  decision	  to	  take	  per	  se.	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Table	  5	  :	  Maximum	  likelihood	  estimates	  from	  hurdle	  model	  	   Probit	  (0=No	  take	  /	  1=Take)	  	   Tobit	  (including	  positive	  amounts	  only)	   Hurdle	  
First	  hurdle	  
	   	   	  Licensing	  condition	   0.36**	  (0.15)	   	   0.52*	  (0.29)	  Gender	  (=0	  if	  male)	   0.01	  (0.15)	   	   0.20	  (0.23)	  Income	   0.13	  (0.10)	   	   0.11	  (0.13)	  Rural	   -­‐0.07	  (0.19)	   	   -­‐0.15	  (0.24)	  Catholic	   -­‐0.01	  (0.22)	   	   -­‐0.14	  (0.32)	  Protestant	   -­‐0.12	  (0.20)	   	   -­‐0.26	  (0.30)	  Risk	  taker	   0.44*	  (0.23)	   	   0.59	  (0.40)	  Constant	   0.15	  (0.43)	   	   0.05	  (0.62)	  
Second	  hurdle	  
	   	   	  Licensing	  condition	   	   5276.91***	  (1526.41)	   3240.27***	  (1502.73)	  Gender	  (=0	  if	  male)	   	   -­‐2120.56	  (1457.34)	   -­‐3864.28***	  (1462.17)	  Income	   	   956.06	  (931.99)	   396.99	  (853.83)	  Rural	   	   439.52	  (1805.94)	   1574.87	  (1680.97)	  Catholic	   	   1504.18	  (2048.84)	   2527.79	  (1937.56)	  Protestant	   	   389.48	  (1901.62)	   2189.37	  (1836.61)	  Risk	  taker	   	   3010.65	  (1954.31)	   208.84	  (1798.3)	  Constant	   	   9596.41**	  (3860.01)	   18664.99***	  (3512.50)	  
Observations	   331	   250	   331	  
p	   0.09	   0.006	   0.03	  
Chi2	   12.27	   19.70	   15.17	  
LogL	   -­‐171.58	   -­‐2704.58	   -­‐2691.30	  
*	  p<0.10;	  **	  p<0.05;	  ***	  p<0.01	   	   	  	  
	  
Another	   interesting	   finding	   pertains	   to	   the	   total	   amount	   remaining	   in	   the	   common	   fund.	   In	   our	  experiment,	   we	   found	   that	   people	   appropriate	   on	   average	   40.88%	   (12,262.84	   Ariary)	   of	   the	   eligible	  amount,	  meaning	  that	  they	  leave,	  or	  share,	  59.12%.	  In	  the	  literature	  on	  pro-­‐social	  preferences,	  the	  dictator	  game	   constitutes	   the	   standard	  measure	   of	   people’s	  willingness	   to	   donate	   to	   a	   receiver.	  Meta	   studies	   of	  dictator	  games	  report	  that	  people	  generally	  share	  about	  30%	  of	  the	  pie	  (Engel,	  2010).	  Similar	  games	  have	  been	  played	  in	  developing	  countries	  that	  reveal	  equivalent	  results	  (31%	  of	  the	  pie,	  Henrich	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Given	  that	  people	  share	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  pie	  in	  this	  study,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  taking	  game	  generates	  higher	  pro-­‐social	  behavior	  than	  the	  traditional	  dictator	  game.	  Although	  these	  two	  games	  are	  not	  directly	  comparable,	   this	   divergence	   indicates	   that	   manipulating	   framing	   could	   lead	   people	   to	   adopt	   different	  sharing	  rules.	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5.	  CONCLUSIONS	  	  
We	  have	  sought	  to	  illustrate,	  in	  a	  developing	  country	  context,	  that	  previous	  good	  deeds	  may	  license	  anti-­‐social	   behavior,	   such	   as	   taking	   from	   a	   social	   surplus.	   This	   work	   provides	   additional	   insight	   into	   the	  motivations	   behind	   anti-­‐social	   behavior	   and	   suggests	   how	   certain	   circumstances	   may	   threaten	   the	  creation	   or	   maintenance	   of	   social	   surplus.	   Our	   results	   contribute	   to	   the	   debate	   on	   whether	   social	  preferences	   should	   be	   considered	   as	   exogenous.	   	   Specifically,	   this	   experiment	   lends	   further	   empirical	  support	   to	   the	   notion	   that	   social	   preferences	   and	  moral	   behavior	   also	   depend	   on	   internal	   factors	   and	  could	  therefore	  vary	  over	  time	  as	  proposed	  by	  the	  moral	  credit	  model.	  
While	  previous	  studies	  regarding	  moral	  credits	  have	  shown	  that	  pro-­‐social	  behavior	  can	  be	  tempered	  due	  to	   the	  moral	  self-­‐licensing	  effect,	  we	  provide	  evidence	  that	  moral	  self-­‐licensing	  can	  also	  encourage	  anti-­‐social	   behavior	   and	   can	   contribute	   to	   explaining	   declines	   in	   a	   social	   surplus.	   Thus,	   we	   find	   that	   the	  licensing	   effect	   not	   only	   decreases	   the	   likelihood	   of	   behaving	   pro-­‐socially,	   but	   it	   also	   increases	   the	  likelihood	  of	  behaving	  anti-­‐socially.	  Having	  experimentally	  this	  effect	  in	  a	  developing	  country	  context,	  this	  work	   confers	   increased	   external	   validity	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   moral	   self-­‐licensing	   behavior,	   adding	  empirical	   evidence	   that	   corroborates	   previous	   results	   found	   in	   the	   literature	   using	   WEIRD	   samples.	  Further	  evidence	  from	  the	  field,	  for	  example	  in	  rural	  areas,	  would	  be	  an	  interesting	  extension	  of	  this	  work	  to	  dispel	  doubts	  regarding	  the	  ‘education’	  and	  ‘welfare’	  components	  of	  this	  effect.	  	  
From	  a	  policy	  perspective,	  our	  research	  implies	  that,	  while	  increases	  in	  pro-­‐social	  behavior	  are	  generally	  viewed	  positively	  by	  governments	  and	  societies,	   these	   increases	  may	  not	  represent	  as	   large	  a	  social	  net	  benefit	  as	  policymakers	  naturally	  assume.	  Evaluating	  increases	  in	  pro-­‐social	  behavior	  without	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  possible	  counter-­‐productive	  side	  effects	  that	  they	  can	  generate	  is	  likely	  to	  overestimate	  their	  impact.	   This	   raises	   the	  need	   to	   develop	   tools	   that	   enable	   a	  multidimensional	   evaluation	   of	   increases	   in	  pro-­‐social	   behaviour.	   It	   is	   entirely	   possible,	   moreover,	   that	   engaging	   in	   some	   good	   deeds	   may	   license	  undesirable	  behaviors	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  the	  bad	  deeds	  may	  even	  cancel	  out	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  the	  initial	  good	  deeds.	  Our	  results	   furthermore	  suggest	   that	   the	  conditions	  under	  which	  pro-­‐social	  behavior	  occurs	   (opt-­‐out	   clause,	   varying	   degree	   of	   investment)	   can	   also	   impact	   subsequent	   licensing	   behavior.	  Pursuing	  further	  insights	  regarding	  the	  underlying	  mechanism	  of	  the	  moral	   licensing	  effect	  represents	  a	  promising	  area	  of	  research	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  minimizing	  the	  potential	  for	  negative	  spillovers	  entailed	  by	  public	  policies	  that	  are	  designed	  to	  encourage	  prosocial	  behavior.	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